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1  Introduction: civil society and South–South 
Development Cooperation amid global 
power shifts 
 
There is a burgeoning literature on the (re)emergence of the BRICS countries – Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa – as significant actors in international development. To 
date, however, most attention has focused on the government-to-government relations 
established through state-led South–South Development Cooperation (SSDC) and the 
BRICS’ engagements in multilateral processes. Much has also been written about the 
growing presence of businesses from the BRICS (especially China) in poorer countries, 
particularly in Africa, and the somewhat tendentious and superficial slant that initially 
characterised much of this work is now starting to give way to a more nuanced analysis of 
the multiple roles played by such businesses in different places and sectors (Brautigam 
2009; Mohan 2013; Navas-Alemán 2015). By comparison with this growing literature on 
governments and businesses, remarkably little attention has been paid to the roles played by 
civil society actors from the BRICS countries by researchers from outside those countries 
themselves.1 In this report we will argue that this has led to a neglect of both their existing 
and their potential contributions to the ongoing transformation of the field of international 
development, amid the broad geopolitical shifts symbolised by the rise of the BRICS. 
 
This report focuses on ‘civil society’ in just one of the many senses in which the term is used: 
the sense summarised by Edwards (2009) as referring to ‘the world of associational life’ 
(rather than alternative conceptualisations of civil society as ‘the good society’ or ‘the public 
sphere’). We are particularly interested in a fairly limited subset of the collective actors who 
populate this ‘world of associational life’ in the BRICS countries: that is, formally structured 
civil society organisations (CSOs) with a history of engagement in project implementation, 
policy dialogue and/or public debate in relation to issues of social and economic 
development at home and abroad. This category includes non-governmental development 
organisations (NGDOs) as well as advocacy non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
working in fields such as human rights and the environment, NGOs with a service provision 
or social entrepreneurship orientation who are operating in the field of corporate social 
responsibility, organisations linked to social movements or labour unions who are active in 
transnational political mobilisation2 and research-oriented NGOs that tend to operate more 
as thinktanks. 
 
These categories are not clear-cut, and often such organisations will – like many of their 
counterparts from ‘traditional donor’ countries – be hybrids playing multiple roles across the 
spectrum of service provision, research, networking and advocacy. These roles and the 
positions vis-à-vis governments and businesses that go with them may also differ according 
to whether development engagements take place at home or abroad – for example, an NGO 
that operates as an uncritical outsourcing partner for government development cooperation 
projects overseas may be fiercely outspoken when it comes to domestic development policy, 
or vice versa. Despite this fluidity, as we will discuss there are often cases where an NGO 
deliberately positions itself on this spectrum or classifies others according to their position on 
it in a way that reflects deeply felt differences in identity and ideology, as well as in political 
                                                                    
1 Though within the BRICS countries there is a growing literature on CSO engagements with each individual country’s 
development cooperation activities – for Brazil, for example, see Santos (2013), Oliveira and Milani (2012) and Milani, Suyama 
and Lopes (2013). 
2 Our focus does not specifically include transnational activist networks, although we do discuss the role of networks like La Vía 
Campesina and the World March of Women that have played a particularly significant role in enabling BRICS-based CSOs to 
link with others elsewhere in the global South. 
6 
 
and economic interests and in the nature of different organisations’ engagements in 
particular transnational networks across the BRICS and beyond. 
 
Our use of the term ‘NGO’ is a convenient shorthand that should not of course imply that we 
assume that all these organisations are fully independent of government; neither do we 
follow a purist definition of ‘civil society’ as an associational realm that is somehow 
completely separable from the state. As we will discuss, the state–civil society boundary in 
the BRICS tends to be more blurred and fluid than it is in Northern ‘traditional donor’ 
countries, and even organisations that cannot be strictly characterised as ‘GONGOs’ 
(government-organised NGOs) often have formal or informal links with state agencies and/or 
governing political parties. This can be the case in the vibrant democratic contexts of the 
‘IBSA’ countries (India, Brazil and South Africa), as much as in the more authoritarian 
contexts of Russia and China. In recent years civil society organisations in the IBSA 
countries have enjoyed a great deal more space to challenge government policy, but this 
does not make CSOs from the other BRICS mere appendages of their governments. In fact, 
we will argue that, across the BRICS, development cooperation policy includes paradoxical 
cases of state–CSO dialogue emerging in unpromising authoritarian contexts and stalling in 
traditionally vibrant democratic ones. 
 
In spite of our focus on formally structured CSOs we do nonetheless recognise the 
importance of other parts of ‘the world of associational life’ in shaping relations between the 
BRICS countries and other low- and middle-income countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. A number of authors have highlighted the role of different networks operating in 
many kinds of space – from old diaspora connections and new migration routes to 
proselytising evangelical churches and transnational feminist exchanges – in shaping the 
BRICS’ involvement in other countries’ development trajectories (Mawdsley and McCann 
2011; Mohan et al. 2014; Van de Kamp 2013; Taela 2011). However, we believe that a focus 
on formally structured CSOs in general and on NGOs in particular is justified because they 
provide some of the most emblematic examples of the transformations that are arising from 
the BRICS’ rapid shift in identity within the field of international development. 
 
This shift, marked by a significant growth in the size, visibility, impact and influence of the 
development cooperation activities of countries that for many years were classified by the 
Northern donor nations primarily as targets for external aid, has been summarised as a 
change in identity ‘from recipients to donors’ – despite the fact that Northern aid continues to 
flow to these countries (albeit in smaller volumes), and that countries identifying with the 
tradition of South–South Cooperation have long been reluctant to classify themselves as 
‘donors’ (Mawdsley 2012; Abdenur and da Fonseca 2013; Inoue and Costa Vaz 2012). In 
this report we argue that a key aspect of the BRICS’ shift in identity relates not so much to 
the volumes of aid-equivalent funding that they now provide to other countries but rather to 
the extent to which they are now seen as a source of development innovations and 
successful models, which has transformed their position within the ‘new knowledge politics 
of development cooperation’ (Shankland and Constantine 2014a). 
 
This report looks at these transformations across the multiple dimensions of international 
development in which civil society organisations from the BRICS play a role. It begins with 
an analysis of the domestic context within which they operate, looking at the ‘enabling 
environment’ for CSO activity within the five BRICS countries in comparative perspective. It 
then examines in greater detail their roles in relation to government policy on development 
cooperation, including the extent to which they have gained access to officially sanctioned 
spaces for policy debate as well as efforts to stimulate debate within national and 
subnational civil society networks themselves. The following section examines CSOs as 
‘development cooperation providers’, both in leading their own South–South cooperation 
initiatives (often invoking solidarity principles) and in delivering government SSDC or 
triangular cooperation projects. The report then moves on to examine transnational 
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development policy spaces, including both the global processes where (traditionally 
Northern-dominated) debates on aid effectiveness and aid transparency have been 
developing and the specific fora associated with the BRICS Summit process and now with 
the creation of the ‘New Development Bank’ initiated by the BRICS countries. 
 
The research on which this report draws was carried out in active dialogue – and often in 
partnership – with a number of key BRICS-based and international CSOs, as well as with the 
research organisations who led the State of the Debate studies conducted by the IDS Rising 
Powers in International Development programme with partners across the BRICS countries 
(Costa Leite et al. 2014; Larionova, Rakhmangulow and Berenson 2014; Chaturvedi et al. 
2014; Gu, Chen and Zhang 2014; Grobbelaar 2014). It consisted not only of an extensive 
review of academic and grey literature and interviews with key informants in academic, civil 
society and government institutions across the BRICS as well as in ‘traditional donor’ 
countries, but also of participant observation in a number of events where CSOs from the 
BRICS were debating how to engage with their countries’ growing individual and collective 
roles in international development. 
 
The first of these was the project synthesis meeting for the ‘Civil Society–BRICS 
Engagement Initiative’, which was led by the FIM-Forum for Democratic Global Governance 
with PRIA (Society for Participatory Research in Asia – India), Instituto Pólis (Brazil), Isandla 
Institute (South Africa), the Participation Centre (China) and the Commission on Social 
Policies, Labour and Living Standards (Russian Federation). At the end of this meeting, 
which took place in Johannesburg in March 2013, IDS, PRIA and FIM co-convened a debate 
on ‘Future Strategies for Civil Society–BRICS Engagement’ which brought project 
participants together with other South African and Brazilian NGOs involved in mobilisation 
around the BRICS Summit that was due to be held in Durban shortly afterwards. The IDS 
team co-convened a similar meeting with Articulação SUL during the BRICS Academic 
Forum in Rio de Janeiro in March 2014, bringing together researchers and activists from 
India, South Africa, Mexico and Mozambique with Brazilian CSOs and academics. 
 
In addition to these co-convened meetings, IDS researchers participated in many national-
level meetings across the BRICS countries in 2013 and 2014 (as part of the State of the 
Debate study process), and in formal and informal civil society debates organised around the 
High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in 
Mexico City in April 2014, as part of the Civil Society-Led South–South Cooperation (CSO-
SSC) project jointly managed by IDS, PRIA and Articulação SUL. One IDS team member 
also carried out ethnographic studies based on participant observation in the BRICS 
‘counter-summits’ organised by civil society groups in Durban (March 2013) and Fortaleza 
(July 2014). Over the course of 2015 we also engaged in extensive discussions with CSOs 
from across the BRICS countries who were working with Oxfam on the EU-funded 
‘Empowering Civil Society Networks in an Unequal Multi-Polar World’ (ECSN-BRICSAM) 
project, including a network planning workshop in Istanbul in February 2015 and subsequent 
virtual meetings as part of the IDS-led mapping study of BRICS and G20 engagement 
(Poskitt et al. 2015). 
 
In the next section we begin by examining the ‘enabling environment’ for civil society 
engagement across the BRICS countries, before going on to look at CSOs’ roles in 
development cooperation policy and practice at the national and international levels, 
including the changing nature of civil society engagement with the BRICS Summit process.  
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2  The state of the enabling environment for 
civil society in the BRICS 
 
Civil society cannot flourish in a vacuum; in development cooperation as in other fields, it 
requires an enabling environment to achieve its full potential. As defined by the CIVICUS 
World Alliance for Citizen Participation, the enabling environment for civil society consists of 
the conditions that affect the capacity of citizens and organisations to engage in 
development processes in an effective and sustained manner, including the legal and 
regulatory framework and political, sociocultural and economic factors (CIVICUS 2013). This 
environment for civil society is markedly different in each of the BRICS countries, despite 
their shared common factor of operating within countries that are shifting from being 
primarily identified as aid recipients to being rising powers in development cooperation. 
 
This common factor means that across the BRICS countries, civil society is facing the 
challenge of balancing competing demands and maintaining relevance, while struggling to 
adapt to these countries’ changing global roles in a context that has long been shaped by 
North–South tensions. CSOs are adjusting to changing domestic demands, as social, 
economic and political change in the BRICS countries shifts the agenda away from classic 
development challenges of absolute poverty and access to services towards inequality, 
environmental issues and governance challenges. At the same time, they are having to 
balance their work on domestic challenges with both engaging with the emerging 
opportunities afforded by South–South Development Cooperation and maintaining their often 
longstanding relationships with multilateral and bilateral donor agencies in a time when these 
agencies’ agendas are changing rapidly. 
2.1  Overview of the enabling environment 
The Enabling Environment Index (EEI) is a CIVICUS initiative, launched in 2013, that ranks 
109 countries using a set of indicators that assess the governance, socioeconomic and 
sociocultural environment that enables civil society to function effectively. It is calculated 
using secondary data on a wide range of sub-dimensions: under the ‘Governance’ heading 
these sub-dimensions are civil society infrastructure, policy dialogue, corruption, political 
rights and freedoms, associational rights, rule of law, personal rights, NGO legal context and 
media freedoms; under the ‘Socioeconomic’ heading they are education, communications, 
equality and gender equality; and under the ‘Sociocultural’ heading they are propensity to 
participate, tolerance, trust, and giving and volunteering.3 The EEI is necessarily limited by 
the availability of secondary data on some of these sub-dimensions, and has been 
questioned by some Southern academics for its reliance on indicators such as formal 
schooling and broadband coverage that correlate poorly with the actual determinants of civil 
society activism in countries with a strong history of social movement mobilisation.4 
Nevertheless, it has the broadest coverage of any comparable index and serves as a 
relatively robust guide to how the enabling environment in the BRICS compares to other 
countries. This comparison shows that among the BRICS, only South Africa and Brazil 
scored higher than the global average, with India, Russia and China being assessed as 
having a relatively poor environment for citizen and civil society participation. 
                                                                    
3 See 
www.civicus.org/downloads/Dimensions%20and%20Indicators%20for%20the%20CIVICUS%20Civil%20Society%20Enabling%
20Environment%20Index.pdf (accessed 9 May 2015). 
4 Carlos Milani, pers. comm. 14 May 2015. 
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Table 2.1  Enabling Environment Index ranking of BRICS 
Country Rank (out of 109) 
South Africa 40th 
Brazil 42nd 
India 67th 
Russia 75th 
China 89th 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on data from CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation (2013). 
 
As Table 2.1 shows, South Africa ranks the highest out of the BRICS countries, with high 
scores for government cooperation and an environment conducive to policy dialogue. This 
result also reinforces our research finding that the South African government has remained 
willing to engage with CSOs, despite the increasing tensions that have marked the 
relationship between civil society and the ruling African National Congress (ANC) following a 
rising tide of corruption allegations and increasingly open conflict with parts of the labour 
movement. 
 
Brazil ranked 2nd of the BRICS, but with low scores in the governance dimension, an 
assessment that was reflected in our interviewees’ comments about the frustration of the 
hopes for a stronger civil society voice in government decision-making that had been raised 
by the arrival in power of the social movement-supported Workers’ Party (PT) in 2003. Since 
the EEI was released, a highly polarised election, the onset of recession and a series of 
corruption scandals have further reinforced this deterioration from the high point in 
government-civil society relations that Brazil reached a decade ago. 
 
India’s surprisingly low ranking derives mainly from its unfavourable socioeconomic context 
(above all its high levels of gender and economic inequality and widespread lack of access 
to communications infrastructure), which had the effect of dragging down the country’s 
overall score despite positive assessments for the governance and sociocultural dimensions 
of its enabling environment. Since the EEI data were collected before the arrival in power of 
the Modi government, it does not reflect the perceived recent deterioration of the legal 
environment for civil society, which is discussed below. 
 
Russia and China both scored fairly well for their socioeconomic environment for civil 
society, but very poorly for their governance contexts. Furthermore, China also scored highly 
in the sociocultural dimension, which suggests there is significant potential for civic action 
and organised civil society in China, although it is currently limited by legal restrictions. This 
is borne out in the international development arena by an increase in fundraising by Chinese 
NGOs from the general public, most recently to support humanitarian response to the Ebola 
crisis, but also notably to support emergency responses after the Nepal earthquake 
(Bannister 2015). 
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Figure 2.1  Enabling Environment Index scores for the BRICS countries 
and global average 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on data from CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation (2013). 
Figure 2.2  Enabling Environment Index scores for the BRICS countries 
and regional average 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, based on data from CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation (2013). 
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Taking the Governance dimension of the EEI in isolation, the differences in scores between 
the IBSA countries on the one hand and China and Russia on the other would seem to 
justify distinguishing the former countries from their fellow BRICS and labelling them as 
‘Democratic Emerging Powers’ or DEPs (Jenkins and Mawdsley 2013). This distinction is 
often made by civil society and government actors alike from the IBSA countries. Despite 
these proclaimed and perceived differences, however, the BRICS share common 
characteristics that make their domestic policy contexts challenging environments for CSOs 
seeking to engage in debates around international development cooperation, and this is the 
case even in the IBSA countries. 
 
The first of these characteristics is a belief in a strong (developmental) state that is endowed 
not only with superior financial and technical resources for promoting national development 
but also with a certain moral superiority. This moral superiority derives from a mix of the 
political legitimacy of state elites as representatives of the interests of the people (whether or 
not they are formally elected to represent these interests) with a more generalised sense of 
entitlement to rule, sometimes combined with a specific claim to have restored the country’s 
greatness or with a revolutionary or otherwise transformative narrative attached to the ruling 
party. This makes it hard for CSOs’ own legitimacy claims to gain purchase, and inclines 
elites towards the view that while civil society organisations may have a place in delivering 
state-conceived policy initiatives, they should not go beyond this in seeking to shape such 
initiatives or propose their own. As we discuss below, this conflicts with CSOs’ own view that 
they are in effect the co-authors if not the originators of many successful policies recently 
adopted in the BRICS. It also predisposes the BRICS to privilege government interlocutors 
for their international cooperation activities, both insisting on the principle of sovereignty 
vested in governments as a key pillar of cooperation and showing much less willingness 
than their Northern donor counterparts to direct their resources to CSOs within partner 
countries.5 
 
The second characteristic is a strong nationalistic tendency in which growing assertiveness is 
mixed with historically rooted anti-colonialism, making life particularly difficult for CSOs who are 
aligned with and/or funded by transnational actors based in the Northern ‘traditional donor’ 
countries. As Tandon and Bandyopadhyay note, ‘for some BRICS States there may be a 
lurking doubt that civil societies, and particularly the CSOs, are a western invention and not to 
be trusted/relied upon’ (2013: 14). This has contributed to the development of an increasingly 
restrictive legal framework, a tendency which is most marked in the more authoritarian contexts 
but is also increasingly evident in the so-called ‘Democratic Emerging Powers’. 
2.2  The legal environment 
There is growing concern over the increasing restrictions that civil society now faces in many 
countries, after a period when the trend seemed to be running towards greater political 
liberalisation (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; The Economist 2014a; CSO Partnership 
for Development Effectiveness 2013; United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to 
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association 2013). Anecdotal civil society reports raising 
this concern are increasingly supported by comprehensive research studies and echoed in 
statements by high-profile political figures. The Task Team on Civil Society Development 
Effectiveness and Enabling Environment (2014) found a mounting body of evidence of 
increasing restrictions on CSOs’ access to foreign and domestic sources of finance and on 
the right to peaceful assembly. In 2013 the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 
recorded that more than 50 restrictive laws had been passed or proposed worldwide that 
would restrict the formation, operation and funding of CSOs, as well as the right to peaceful 
assembly (ICNL 2013). In 2015, China began consultations on a new ‘Overseas NGO 
Management Law’, which raised concern that it would have a restrictive effect on national as 
                                                                    
5 We are indebted to Emma Mawdsley for this observation. 
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well as international NGOs operating in China (Bannister 2015). Such restrictions have drawn 
expressions of concern both from global campaigners for human rights and from 
representatives of established powers with a vested interest in challenging the legitimacy of 
the BRICS countries. At the UN Special Meeting on the Post-2015 Agenda, for example, 
President Obama stated that the world was witnessing 
 
a growing number of countries that are passing laws designed specifically to stifle civil 
society. They’re forcing groups to register with governments, eroding human rights 
protections, restricting NGOs from accessing foreign funding, cracking down on 
communications technologies that connect civil society groups around the globe. In 
more extreme cases, activists and journalists have been arrested on false charges, 
and some have been killed. We're also seeing new and fragile democracies cracking 
down on civil society, which…sets them back and sends a dangerous signal to other 
countries. 
(White House 2013: para. 9) 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, 
Maina Kiai, has highlighted the restrictions on an organisation’s ability to access financial 
resources as a violation of the right to freedom of association. In his annual report to the 
Human Rights Council in April 2013, Maina Kiai specifically noted the restrictions introduced 
in Russia, which in November 2012 began implementing a law requiring NGOs receiving 
foreign funding and conducting ‘political’ activities to register as ‘foreign agents’. Government 
officers began making unannounced inspections of over 2,000 NGOs in search of ‘foreign 
agents’. During these inspections, officials demanded a wide variety of information, from 
staff lists to tax records. The first conviction under the new law came in April 2013 against 
Golos, an election-monitoring organisation. Foreign NGOs, such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group, were similarly subject to 
spontaneous inspections despite falling outside the purview of the 2012 law. The arrest of  
30 Greenpeace activists in the Arctic in 2013 was widely seen as exemplifying this new and 
harder line on internationally linked CSO activity. After Russia expelled the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) from the country in October 2012, accusing it of 
meddling in politics, Russian NGOs accused of implementing ‘political’ or other activities 
considered to constitute threats to the interests of the Russian Federation were prohibited 
from receiving any US funding (ICNL 2013). 
 
In India, there have been recent moves by the government to increase the restrictions on CSOs 
that receive funding from international organisations. A report by the Intelligence Bureau, 
India’s internal intelligence agency, accusing several NGOs of stalling major infrastructure 
projects, was leaked in May 2014. The report accused ‘foreign-funded’ NGOs of ‘anti-
development activities’ and ‘serving as tools for foreign policy interests of western 
governments’. Organisations and individuals working on environmental, land rights or anti-
nuclear issues were specifically mentioned in the report as using ‘people-centric issues to 
create an environment which lends itself to stalling development projects’. The report claimed 
that India’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate fell by 2 to 3 per cent because of 
civil society campaigns between 2011 and 2013 (Mashru 2014). While this type of accusation 
and the targeting of environmental CSOs in India are not new,6 several civil society figures 
expressed concerns that the timing of the leaked report, just days after Narendra Modi became 
prime minister, suggested that new tougher restrictions would be introduced by the 
government. After a clampdown on funding transfers that specifically targeted Greenpeace, 
Kumi Naidoo, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Greenpeace, claimed that ‘we are part of a 
broader community of civil society in India and so recognise that the attacks on Greenpeace 
are not just attacks against Greenpeace’ (Chilkoti 2014). Interviewees cited examples since the 
                                                                    
6 In 2012 NGOs funded by the US and by Scandinavian countries were accused of fuelling protests against the Kudankulam 
nuclear project in Tamil Nadu (see www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-17150953). 
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leaked report of several other CSOs, researchers and academics who had had their bank 
accounts frozen and of international NGO staff being denied visas to enter India, as well as of 
Indian activists being prevented from travelling to the UK. 
2.3  Civil society and domestic development innovations 
Although they affect CSOs’ freedom of manoeuvre for engaging in debates on international 
development cooperation, the principal focus of the restrictions discussed above is not 
international, but rather civil society engagement in the domestic development policy 
debates within BRICS countries, particularly in relation to governance, human rights and 
environmental issues. Tensions in these fields are of course by no means new, and in many 
cases they contain echoes of past struggles, whether against the military dictatorship in 
Brazil, the Soviet system in Russia, the suppression of dissent in China, the State of 
Emergency in India or apartheid in South Africa. These echoes mean that state elites are 
particularly sensitive to challenge in these fields, either because they identify with the 
regimes that were targeted by these struggles and fear a repeat of the legitimacy challenges 
that they represented (in the case of China and Russia) or because they consider that they 
themselves are the legitimate heirs of these struggles and the custodians of the aspirations 
for justice that they embodied (in the case of Brazil and South Africa), and cannot thus be 
criticised in the same terms as the regimes that they helped to end. 
 
However, there are many within civil society across the BRICS countries who argue that 
amid their concern with proclaiming their own development successes, state elites have 
ignored the role that CSO-led struggles for human rights and social and environmental 
justice played in shaping these very successes. Widely trumpeted policy innovations that 
have been spread through South–South Development Cooperation, such as India’s 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and Brazil’s Bolsa Família 
(literally, ‘family stipend’) social protection programme, had their roots in civil society 
campaigns for an end to hunger and poverty and against the corruption that marked 
governments’ existing anti-poverty initiatives. As the Brazil State of the Debate report put it, 
‘many public policies which are shared by the Brazilian government with other developing 
countries are seen as the result of social dynamics and political struggles that had civil 
society as a key player’ (Costa Leite et al. 2014: 63–4). 
 
In addition to campaigning, CSOs from the BRICS have also accumulated long experience 
in implementing development projects in their home countries. This has enabled them to 
develop innovative ‘social technologies’ at the local level, as was highlighted by a major 
Indian civil society workshop on development cooperation which concluded that ‘it is 
important to acknowledge civil society contribution in innovation and applications of 
development methodologies particularly in the context of local diversities’ (PRIA 2013: 6). 
This experience has also enabled them to aggregate local experiences into broader 
alternative approaches to development, which many CSOs are arguing should have a more 
central role in shaping SSDC. Costa Leite et al. argue, for example, that ‘Brazilian civil 
society has developed experience and knowledge that supports the pursuit of alternative 
development paradigms, which is not being adequately incorporated into the portfolio of 
official cooperation’ (2014). 
 
The spur for these innovations has often been social and political contestation of the 
inequality that is a marked feature of all the BRICS. As Scerri, Soares and Maharajh have 
argued, ‘inequality is a peculiar trait of these countries comprising a key factor for 
understanding both the configuration and the dynamic of the national innovation systems of 
BRICS’ (2014: 7).  
 
The same authors show that in the years that saw the BRICS’ rise (or return) to global 
prominence and a dramatic reduction in their average poverty levels, inequality intensified 
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across the five countries – with the single notable exception of Brazil. However, even Brazil’s 
dramatic success in reducing inequality now seems to be faltering in the face of economic 
and political challenges. Since the decline started from an extremely high base level, 
inequality in Brazil even now remains higher than any other BRICS country except South 
Africa, and there is mounting evidence that income inequality in Brazil has stopped falling, 
while wealth inequality in the country may actually be growing (Krozer 2015). 
Figure 2.3  Change in inequality levels, early 1990s versus late 2000s (Gini 
coefﬁcient of household income) 
 
Source: Adapted from Scerri et al. (2014: 8). 
 
CSOs have made a distinctive contribution to the dynamics that have given the BRICS and 
other middle-income ‘rising powers’ their unique combination of global influence, high 
inequality and high innovation capacity (Shankland and Constantine 2014a). This 
contribution has been made through alternating and sometimes simultaneous processes of 
contestation and collaboration with governments and with other actors who are helping to 
shape development policy and practice in the BRICS, including social movements, 
businesses and thinktanks. 
 
CSOs from the IBSA countries interviewed during our research complained that their capacity 
to drive innovative responses to development challenges was being systematically undervalued 
by governments. However, they acknowledged that there was a continued and in some cases 
increased willingness on the part of governments to fund NGOs to provide outsourced 
government services and deliver targeted anti-poverty programmes. India’s new government is 
a case in point; regarded with hostility by many CSOs for its commitment to brushing aside 
social and environmental justice concerns in pursuit of a development model tailored to suit the 
interests of ‘big capital’, it was nonetheless described by interviewees as pragmatic and open to 
dialogue on the potential for civil society involvement in development initiatives – at least within 
the framework described by Dagnino as that of ‘the neoliberal project, which requires the 
shrinking of the social responsibilities of the state and their transference to civil society’ (2008: 
57). 
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At the same time, Chinese interviewees pointed to an increased willingness on the part of 
the government to allow them (and in some cases to fund them) to take the lead in 
experimenting with solutions to development and service delivery challenges at local and 
provincial level, with Yunnan Province and the city of Shenzhen being cited as examples, as 
well as the remarkable experiment in participatory budgeting in the city of Chengdu 
(Cabannes and Zhuang 2014). Domestic and international observers alike have described a 
proliferation of both informal and legally registered NGOs and a rapidly improving regulatory 
environment for ‘social organisations’ in China in recent years, despite continued 
nervousness about the prospect of a resumption in the pattern of periodic crackdowns that 
has marked the government’s relationship with organisations that lie beyond its direct control 
(Simon 2011; The Economist 2014b; Bannister 2015). At the same time as expressing 
concern over the tightening of state control exemplified by the ‘Overseas NGO Management 
Law’ proposed in May 2015, Chinese CSOs recognise the potential for partnering with state 
actors to achieve their objectives, within what has been called a ‘contested symbiosis’ 
(Zhang 2015). Even in Russia, a study for the international ‘Civil Society at the Crossroads’ 
project found that many activists outside Moscow were optimistic about the opening up of 
spaces for constructive engagement and CSO-led development activities at the local level, 
even while the clampdown on democracy and human rights movements in the capital 
continued to intensify (Buxton and Konovalova 2012; cf. Cook et al. 2015). 
 
There thus appears to be a pattern whereby state elites across the BRICS are open to and 
even encouraging of civil society engagement in tackling the challenges of poverty and 
inequality that continue to affect their countries, at least in part because they are aware of 
the risks of political instability that arise from these challenges. State elites nevertheless 
remain determined to set the terms of the engagement and are wary of any challenge to 
their overall political legitimacy and control over policy processes. The confluence of these 
factors results in a situation where, as Tandon and Brown put it, ‘political space for civil 
society voice and action seems to be expanding and contracting simultaneously’ (2013: 
790). 
 
This means that after many years of struggle to remain active in broader policy debates beyond 
the outsourcing role to which neoliberalism sought to consign them, CSOs are now finding 
themselves pushed back into this role by the BRICS’ state-led development model. The result 
is that while there is still the potential for innovations to be generated within local civil society-
led development initiatives, many opportunities for them to be scaled up into national policy – 
and fed into international development cooperation – are likely to be lost. 
2.4  Funding and sustainability 
The increased dependence of CSOs on government funding for tightly circumscribed local 
development activities is just one of the ways in which the funding environment for national and 
local civil society organisations in BRICS countries is being markedly affected by geopolitical 
and economic changes. CSOs interviewed during the study argued that there is a pressing 
need to consider new, alternative sources of funding, as philanthropic and solidarity-based 
flows alike are being redirected to poorer countries and traditional donors are reducing, and in 
some cases ending, bilateral funding to middle-income countries.7 
 
While Northern donor aid funding comes with its own limitations and impositions (from overly 
rigid results measurement approaches to predetermined priority focus areas), it has 
nevertheless been a key resource for some of the most influential and innovative NGDOs from 
the BRICS. Over the last decade key NGDOs from India and Brazil have lost much of the 
                                                                    
7 For example, UK bilateral aid to South Africa and India ended completely in 2015 (see DFID 2013, ‘UK to End Direct Financial 
Support to South Africa’ and DFID 2012, ‘India: Greening Announces New Development Relationship’). However, aid flows 
from OECD-DAC member countries to Brazil have actually increased in recent years and remain far greater than the country’s 
own overseas development cooperation budget (Carlos Milani, pers. comm. 14 May 2015). 
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access to international NGO or foundation funding that they had used to maintain a degree of 
autonomy from government or business influences while combining local projects with 
knowledge generation and policy advocacy (Moilwa et al. 2015). South African NGDOs have 
now begun to be subjected to the same pressures, though the phasing out of bilateral aid to 
South Africa began more recently, and they continue to some extent to be shielded by their 
strategic location on the African continent, still the epicentre of activity for the global aid 
industry. 
 
As outlined above, the policy and political context in the BRICS is problematic for a simple 
shift from overseas to domestic funding. In a press release after the leak of the Intelligence 
Bureau memo on restricting access to foreign funding, the CSO platform Voluntary Action 
Network India (VANI) argued that: 
 
In the last decade the relationship between government and NGOs has changed 
drastically. NGOs are not seen as the partners in development but rather as 
subcontractors. They are supposed to bid on fixed projects and deliver the projects without 
asking questions. The sector which was known for its innovations has become [a] tool for 
delivering the projects. At the same time, taxation reforms that facilitate domestic 
generation of funds as CSR [corporate social responsibility] provisions of the Companies 
Act, have not taken place. Civil society in India is still in the charity mode of philanthropy 
and has not moved to a mature level of society wherein private donation is motivated by 
the overall development of [the] country. 
(VANI 2014: 2) 
 
While the modes and levels of domestic philanthropy are different within each of the BRICS 
countries due to a range of historical, cultural, economic and regulatory issues, and there is 
a lack of research and transparent data on the funds for development assistance and 
philanthropy within all of these countries, our interviews suggested that they have in 
common a relative lack of depth and sophistication among domestic philanthropic funders 
and a marked tendency to prioritise funding for localised social assistance rather than 
strategic, policy-oriented research and advocacy work. In addition, the slowdown in 
economic growth affecting most of the BRICS countries is likely to reduce the availability of 
domestic philanthropic funding. This intensifies the need to generate new, alternative 
sources of funding, given that despite recent declines a significant proportion of funding for 
organisations in the BRICS countries working on research and advocacy programmes 
related to SSDC still comes from foreign donors. 
 
International NGOs with a long-established presence in the BRICS countries, such as Oxfam 
and ActionAid, are continuing to support strategic research and advocacy work and 
increasingly seeking to support the strengthening of civil society networks across the 
BRICS.8 However, they have also been establishing ‘nationalised’ branches in these 
countries that are often seen by national NGDOs as competitors for funding – as well as 
continuing to suffer accusations of being foreign agents, despite their changed legal status 
and national staff and leadership. 
 
BRICS-based CSOs interviewed during the research acknowledged that these pressures are 
contributing to their growing interest in engaging in international development cooperation 
work as their countries continue to ‘go global’. Some national NGOs are seeking to follow the 
success of international NGO operations based in the BRICS countries – such as ActionAid 
and Médecins Sans Frontières in Brazil – in raising funds locally for humanitarian and 
development work overseas, often using social media and innovative web-based fundraising 
platforms to connect with the broader public. They are also seeking to strengthen their 
research profile and access growing national budgets for development-related research. 
                                                                    
8 See, for example, the Oxfam project on ‘Empowering CSO Networks in the BRICS, Mexico and Indonesia’ 
(http://csnbricsam.org). 
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Expanding SSDC budgets in particular are seen as a valuable potential source of funds, as 
well as an opportunity to showcase internationally the development innovations for which 
CSOs are finding it increasingly hard to advocate domestically. At the same time, there is 
growing awareness that the transparency, governance, social and environmental justice 
issues around which CSOs have long mobilised domestically are now appearing in relation 
to their countries’ government and corporate engagements overseas. The ways in which 
they have started to grapple with these issues are the focus of the next section of this report. 
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3  Civil society and development cooperation 
policy in the BRICS countries 
 
Civil society in the BRICS is highly accustomed to the modalities of development assistance, 
with which it has engaged largely but by no means exclusively from a recipient perspective. 
As well as receiving assistance from traditional Northern donors for several decades, each of 
the BRICS countries has a long history of providing development cooperation to regional and 
political allies, which has sometimes provided CSOs with opportunities for international 
engagement. As discussed above, CSOs in the BRICS have vast experience of implementing 
social policies and working closely with development agencies in their domestic contexts, 
often leading to innovations that have subsequently been spread internationally through 
South–South Development Cooperation (SSDC) processes. In recent years, concurrent with 
the growing role of BRICS countries in international cooperation and their increasing flows of 
overseas investment, the economic and development cooperation policies of these countries 
have become a more frequent topic of debate within civil society. Capturing the ‘state of the 
debate’ in civil society in rising power countries on SSDC and engagement with BRICS as a 
policymaking forum requires capturing a range of different voices; civil society is 
heterogeneous, representing a wide range of interests, ideologies and sectors in both urban 
and rural areas, often with little unity or coordination. However, our research suggests that 
some general trends can be observed. 
 
The first such trend is that despite the increasing interest, debate on SSDC within domestic 
civil society across most of the BRICS remains embryonic and only a small number of voices 
are currently steering the debate. Many of the ideas and narratives are still being formed with 
little documentation or published organisational policy, and lack of access to information on 
what is often seen as a remote and complex foreign-policy issue remains a significant 
obstacle to participation by a broader range of CSOs in this debate. India and Brazil in 
particular have seen policy-oriented NGOs making significant efforts to reach out to social 
movements and to regional and local CSOs in an attempt to achieve a critical mass of civil 
society engagement in SSDC policy debates, but thus far with only limited success. A general 
absence of parliamentary debate and media discussion on SSDC, as well as a shortage of 
publicly available data, have made it harder to expand their currently limited domestic 
constituencies for SSDC engagement, although there is some evidence that favourable 
conditions exist for these constituencies to grow over time as countries like India respond to 
their new visibility as rising ‘donors’ (Mawdsley 2014). 
 
As a result, both capacity and demand for CSOs in the BRICS to engage outside their 
countries remain limited. Given that these countries still have high levels of poverty and 
inequality, the majority of CSOs understandably believe that their primary mission must 
continue to be engagement on domestic issues. Nevertheless, while in general BRICS NGOs 
still lack domestic support (and funding) for work on the rights and needs of ‘distant strangers’ 
in foreign countries when there are still considerable local development challenges, there is 
also evidence that this is beginning to change. In particular, humanitarian engagements with 
emergencies beyond their borders can draw wide public support – particularly when these 
engagements result from natural disasters, as with Russia’s support for earthquake response 
in Armenia, Brazil’s in Haiti or India’s in Nepal.9 Although such interventions tend to be led by 
government agencies (especially the military), CSOs are often also involved, and in some 
cases operate autonomously in carrying out humanitarian interventions. The South African 
NGO Gift of the Givers (discussed below) is a particularly prominent example, but as noted 
                                                                    
9 We are grateful to Emma Mawdsley for drawing this to our attention. 
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above Chinese NGOs have also recently started to raise funds directly from the public for 
humanitarian work overseas, notably in response to the Nepal earthquake and the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa. 
 
When the focus is on long-term development cooperation rather than emergency response, 
the most visible organisations engaging with BRICS governments on SSDC and foreign-
policy issues are generally not NGOs or social movements but thinktanks.10 The BRICS 
summits have often catalysed events that increase civil society dialogue and engagement on 
SSDC issues, but in the absence of an officially recognised CSO platform, this engagement 
has tended to function via academic channels, especially as recent years have seen the 
Academic Forum of the BRICS Summit gradually opening up to allow CSOs to attend. Even 
after an official ‘Civic BRICS’ platform was established in 2015, as discussed below 
thinktanks dominated its inaugural meeting ahead of the Russia BRICS Summit. This 
cemented a process whereby across the BRICS countries – and especially in Russia and 
China – thinktanks with strong links to government have been emerging as the most 
important brokers of CSO access to international development policy processes. This, in 
turn, has made it harder for locally and regionally based CSOs and movements with less 
experience of operating in elite policy spaces to gain a foothold in debates on international 
development cooperation – and easier for governments to exclude civil society voices that 
they find inconvenient. 
 
In addition to the difficulty in bridging gaps between CSOs operating at different levels and 
with different degrees of familiarity with elite policy processes, civil society engagement on 
SSDC is ideologically fragmented. Significant divisions are emerging between CSOs and 
movements whose ideological positions fall into three loose categories: those that regard the 
BRICS as a ‘sub-imperialist’ group, bent on intensifying the extraction of resources from 
formerly colonised countries that have not managed to become rising powers as well as from 
marginalised territories within their own borders; those that regard the BRICS uncritically as a 
progressive force in geopolitics and a source of opportunities in the global economy; and 
those that favour pragmatic engagement which maximises their potential to open space 
internationally for BRICS-based CSOs while minimising the negative social and environmental 
impacts of their roles overseas. These differing positions have been variously categorised as 
‘BRICS from above, BRICS from the middle, and BRICS from below’ (Bond 2015) and as 
‘commentators, collaborators and critics’ (Mawdsley and Roychaudhury 2014). 
 
Another common feature across the BRICS countries is that the role played by international 
NGOs in debates on SSDC is seen as extremely important, while also being highly contested. 
In our research, national organisations recognised the value of international non-
governmental organisation (INGO) expertise, financial support and ability to convene cross-
BRICS networking initiatives while simultaneously expressing a certain resentment of their 
power and influence and wariness of the risks of becoming too dependent on them. As we 
discuss below, this ambivalence contains echoes of the discord between Northern and 
Southern organisations that marked previous transnational aid policy processes, such as the 
‘Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness’ that preceded the 2011 Busan High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness. It also reflects a sense of frustration among Southern CSOs that 
the power inequalities between the two groups of actors remain in place despite the broad 
shift in the historic asymmetries between global North and South symbolised by the rise of the 
BRICS. National organisations want to take ownership of development policy engagement 
and establish their role in SSDC, but given the constraints on their domestic enabling 
environments they remain dependent for funding and even for technical support on 
international NGOs. The latter in turn are reluctant to leave the scene, both because they 
                                                                    
10 It should be noted, however, that these ‘thinktanks’ tend to be a mix of government agencies and university-linked research 
institutes; the type of private, policy-oriented research organisation generally described as a ‘thinktank’ in the Northern policy 
studies literature is the exception rather than the rule in several of the BRICS countries, including Brazil (Carlos Milani, pers. 
comm. 14 May 2015). 
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need to assert their continued relevance in the new landscape of international development 
cooperation and because they believe that they still have valuable expertise to offer their 
longstanding partners in the BRICS as the latter start to engage with often unfamiliar 
international policy agendas and processes. 
3.1  BRICS public opinion and media debate on development 
cooperation 
As discussed above, one of the key challenges for civil society constituency-building in 
relation to SSDC is limited media coverage and consequently the low visibility of public 
debate on development cooperation. The BRICS – like other large and complex countries 
with their own problems of poverty and inequality – tend to be inward-looking in their debates 
on development, and this is reflected in a relative scarcity of media debate on their roles in 
international development cooperation. Even where international engagements have 
become a focus of political debate, as was the case when sectors of the Brazilian media 
accused the government of ‘Third Worldism’ after President Lula began to spearhead a 
major expansion of the country’s presence in Africa, the actual nature and content of 
development cooperation activities are rarely discussed (Constantine 2012). 
 
Some interviewees suggested that governments have been reluctant to encourage public 
debate for fear that this could lead to criticism that they were diverting scarce resources 
away from domestic development challenges. In meetings we observed after Brazil was 
shaken in 2013 by mass protests that included calls for greater investments in domestic 
health, education and transport infrastructure, civil society groups accused the government 
of holding back the publication of the latest official development cooperation report and 
resisting calls to establish a public forum on development cooperation policy out of fear that 
the political opposition and right-wing media would exploit them as opportunities to accuse 
the ruling Workers’ Party of favouring the needs and rights of distant strangers over those of 
their own protesting citizens. Observers have noted similar concerns in India; as Rani Mullen 
of the Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research put it, ‘India is unlikely to domestically 
publicise the fact it feeds nearly 2 million Afghani children on a daily basis when 43 per cent 
of its own under-five year olds are malnourished.’11 
 
However, such fears are probably overstated, as the existing evidence suggests that public 
opinion in the BRICS on international development cooperation is underdeveloped rather 
than hostile, with a low level of awareness of what cooperation currently involves but a 
generally favourable view of it in principle.12 The IDS ‘International Public Opinion Monitor’ 
initiative, which surveyed a large sample of ‘opinion-formers’ across India, Brazil and South 
Africa in 2013–14, found that support for international development cooperation activities 
was higher than expected, with a majority or at least a plurality favouring the provision of 
financial and other forms of support to other developing nations across all three countries. In 
India, the study found that ‘almost 63 per cent were of the view that India should provide aid 
to other developing countries, while only 28 per cent considered this not to be appropriate’; 
the corresponding figures for Brazil were 51 per cent for and 40 per cent against, while in 
South Africa they were 47 per cent in favour and 45 per cent opposed (Henson 2014a, 
2014b, 2014c). 
 
The reasons given for supporting international development cooperation in the survey and 
among interviews and media commentaries analysed by the State of the Debate report 
teams varied widely, reflecting a mix of national pride, solidarity and self-interest. Such 
cooperation was seen as potentially playing a role in regional security and stability and 
promoting commercial interests, but also as a question of religious and/or political solidarity, 
                                                                    
11 Quoted in Brant and Romanes (2013). 
12 For a discussion of this phenomenon in relation to Indian public opinion and development cooperation, see Mawdsley (2014). 
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as a necessary aspect of playing a larger role in the world and as a reflection of the 
imperative to help others around the world who are still struggling with the poverty against 
which people in the BRICS themselves feel that their countries are starting to make 
headway. However, since the follow-up survey round has not yet been carried out, there is a 
lack of data on whether these levels of support have remained, or whether they have 
declined as a result of deteriorating economic conditions in most of the BRICS, which may 
be leading to greater concern with domestic development needs. 
3.2  Spaces for civil society–government dialogue on 
development cooperation policy in the BRICS countries 
The interaction between civil society and BRICS governments on South–South Development 
Cooperation has been uneven, shaped by differences in the enabling environment across 
the BRICS countries and by the heterogeneous nature of both civil society structures and 
government policy architectures. In most countries engagement on issues related to SSDC 
and foreign policy has been ad hoc. Partly this reflects a lack of policy coordination within 
government itself; for example, in South Africa more than half of the government’s 
departments are involved in international cooperation, while the Brazil State of the Debate 
study showed how different government agencies were acting largely independently of the 
Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), which is supposed to coordinate the country’s 
development cooperation activities (Costa Leite et al. 2014). The disparate nature of SSDC 
and its distribution across numerous government departments makes it difficult for civil 
society to coordinate its participation in debates about SSDC initiatives, as different CSOs 
may engage with different line ministries or parastatal bodies within their areas of 
specialisation without realising that others may be discussing similar issues in different policy 
sectors. 
 
It is evident that political dynamics between government departments, as well as debates 
about the appropriateness of establishing development cooperation as a policy area in its 
own right remain a delicate issue in several of the BRICS. This includes China, where the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) have frequently 
tussled over the control of international development cooperation policy, and Russia, where 
observers have reported on a ‘tug-of-war between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs over who would have the upper hand in providing both the vision and the 
infrastructure for Russia’s overseas aid programme’ (Gray 2012). 
 
Greater coordination and the establishment of robust development agencies in the BRICS 
are seen as providing opportunities for civil society to monitor and engage with the 
government more effectively on issues related to SSDC, as was the case in Mexico after the 
creation of the country’s new development cooperation agency, AMEXCID (Poskitt and 
Shankland 2014: 4). The announcements of the creation of India’s Development 
Partnerships Administration (DPA) and of the South African Development Partnership 
Agency (SADPA) were welcomed by civil society, although long delays in effectively 
establishing these agencies subsequently led civil society interviewees to express frustration 
at the slow pace of institutionalisation of CSO participation in SSDC policymaking debates. 
 
In Brazil, the president’s announcement of reforms to the Brazilian Cooperation Agency in 
May 2013 was welcomed as an opportunity for engagement, though CSOs also expressed 
concern at the apparent focus on strengthening links between aid and trade, and the reforms 
were subsequently shelved (Costa Leite et al. 2014). Although individual government 
departments and policy fora such as the National Food and Nutrition Security Council 
(CONSEA) have provided opportunities for more strategic dialogue in certain sectors, and 
the Ministry of External Affairs did run a series of ‘Foreign Policy Dialogues’ in 2014, 
Brazilian CSOs criticise the lack of a permanent official space in which overarching policies 
and practices related to SSDC are discussed, linking this to a general reluctance to treat 
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foreign policy as a ‘normal’ policy area that should be subject to public debate on a regular 
basis (Milani and Pinheiro 2013). 
 
By contrast, the Forum for Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC) is an example of a more 
systemic and inclusive process to promote debate on Indian development cooperation 
policy. FIDC is a multi-stakeholder body that is made of up of government departments, 
research institutions and CSOs. Launched in 2013, it is a forum where some CSOs have 
been able to participate in debates about the trends, challenges and opportunities of SSDC. 
It has also commissioned studies of CSO engagement in development cooperation, and its 
willingness to give visibility to civil society experience was welcomed by interviewees, though 
some also expressed frustration with the increasing centralisation of FIDC’s agenda in the 
hands of its host organisation Research and Information System for Developing Countries 
(RIS), a thinktank affiliated with the Ministry of External Affairs. FIDC has played an 
increasingly central role in development cooperation debates in India, and in this context it is 
significant that its special publication marking the 2015 India-Africa Summit highlighted 
examples of development cooperation involving CSOs (Arora and Chand 2015). 
 
Alongside more regularised fora such as FIDC, there is also evidence of an increased 
willingness to engage with civil society on an ad hoc basis when BRICS countries are hosting 
major international events or involved in multilateral negotiations for which they need to prepare 
positions that have broad-based domestic support. In some countries – including South Africa 
and Brazil – the ‘sherpas’ (senior officials responsible for preparing summit meetings) have 
shown considerable openness to dialogue with CSOs ahead of major policy moments such as 
the BRICS summits (Poskitt et al. 2015). While noting the lack of an institutionalised dialogue 
forum, one South African civil society interviewee emphasised that the Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) ‘has accepted every request to meet with civil 
society’. 
 
In general, even where specific agencies have been established outside ministries of foreign 
affairs, the policy elite still tends to regard development cooperation as a domain of foreign 
policy, which civil society does not have a strong tradition of influencing in any of the BRICS 
countries. Foreign policy is seen as bound up with strategic issues of national security and 
geopolitical positioning that have traditionally been closed to civil society engagement, even 
in countries like Brazil that have a rich history of dialogue in other policy sectors (Milani and 
Pinheiro 2013). Some interviewees argued that this had worked against Brazilian civil 
society’s efforts to secure government commitment to establish a permanent forum on 
development cooperation policy. When the large coalition of NGOs and academic institutions 
assembled for this purpose opted to campaign for the establishment of a Foreign Policy 
Council rather than one more narrowly focused on development cooperation, the result was 
to encourage the conservative establishment of the Itaramaty (Brazil’s foreign office) to dig in 
its heels, although after intensive lobbying by academics and CSO leaders linked to the 
Workers’ Party the government did commit itself to establishing the Council. 
3.3  Who speaks for civil society in the BRICS countries? 
Even when an officially recognised permanent space for policy engagement is established, 
CSOs must still grapple with issues of power, voice and representation. Several interviewees 
commented that the space that exists to discuss and contribute to foreign policy and SSDC 
debates across all the BRICS is dominated by elite groups in civil society. Meetings with 
government officials and sherpas, events organised at the BRICS summits, and attendance 
at international conferences such as those held around the BRICS Summit or G20, have 
primarily been restricted to international NGOs, thinktanks, academics and small elite 
organisations that usually receive foreign funding. National and community-based 
organisations are often absent from these debates and arenas. In India, for example, the 
dominant role of a small elite group of organisations in analysing and influencing India’s 
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foreign policy led leading civil society figure Rajesh Tandon to speak of a ‘vacuum of 
intellectual engagement in foreign policy within civil society in India’ (PRIA 2013: 3). 
Similarly, a South African civil society actor has stated that ‘when it comes to foreign policy 
and international relations, these discussions seem to be the domain of an elite group of 
thinktanks, experts, international NGOs and representatives from business forums’ 
(Pressend 2013). While there was much criticism among our interviewees of the self-serving 
nature of this control of the agenda by a narrow elite, there was also recognition that most 
CSOs in the BRICS countries lack the basic level of familiarity with the policy debates in this 
field that would enable them to participate fully. 
 
Some established CSOs have sought to remedy this situation, including Rajesh Tandon’s 
own organisation, PRIA, which has led a series of outreach workshops with local and 
regional CSOs around India in an effort to broaden the development cooperation debate 
beyond the capital. Brazilian CSOs committed to a similar outreach process ahead of the 
country’s hosting of the BRICS Summit in 2014, and although a lack of both funds and 
coordination limited the impact of this process it has since given rise to initiatives such as the 
online Observatory of Brazil in the South, which provides both basic information and 
sophisticated analysis to a growing base of interested CSOs.13 Brazil has also seen 
increasing civil society interest in the debates promoted since 2012 by the ‘International 
Relations Reflection Group’ (GR-RI), a discussion forum bringing together influential thinkers 
from across the internationalist Brazilian Left (including independents and members of the 
Communist and Socialist parties as well as of the ruling Workers’ Party) which is defined by 
one of its founders as ‘an informal group that gathers progressive and left-wing intellectuals, 
political activists, civil society movements and political party representatives, besides some 
civil servants (as individuals) from the presidency and federal ministries, including 
Itamaraty’;14 although the GR-RI remains a fairly exclusive grouping, its membership has 
grown in recent years. South Africa has seen an attempt to establish a more institutionalised 
civil society-led platform, in a process that began when, in response to the lack of debate 
within society about South Africa’s role internationally, a group of CSOs established the 
South African Forum for International Solidarity (SAFIS) in 2011 (see Box 3.1). 
                                                                    
13 See http://obs.org.br. 
14 Carlos Milani, pers. comm. 14 May 2015. 
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Box 3.1 The South African Forum for International Solidarity (SAFIS) 
SAFIS is a civil society network established in 2011 seeking to influence the debate and policymaking 
mechanisms in Pretoria. The group of civil society organisations and activists was formed amid much 
excitement and momentum, with one of the greatest strengths of this group being its diversity as it is 
made up of international NGOs, local groups, the trade union confederation COSATU and other 
networks. The group committed to a set of principles and aspirations, stating that: 
 ‘We believe in and commit ourselves to the creation of a new, democratic and just world order 
where equality of nations and people, freedom from poverty and hunger, environmental justice 
and solidarity are the principal interests driving international relations. 
 We respect and support human rights, including the right to self-determination, and commit 
ourselves to standing in solidarity against all forms of oppression, occupation and injustice, 
wherever these occur. 
 We call for the prioritisation, in the struggle to resolve global affairs, of the crises faced by 
people of the global South, who are disproportionately victims of environmental devastation and 
injustice. 
 We call for a progressive, democratic and pro-poor foreign policy, informed by a holistic 
definition of national interest that is not confined to narrow commercial or class interests. Only 
such a foreign policy allows us to celebrate our inter-connectedness with all of humanity, and to 
discharge our responsibilities as global citizens in South Africa’ (SAFIS 2013). 
 
An interesting characteristic of SAFIS is that it is largely a locally driven initiative, established by 
South African organisations that recognised the need for civil society to have a more coordinated and 
effective impact on the government’s foreign policy. The coalition is a loose grouping of grass-roots 
organisations, activists and the South African offices of international organisations. Oxfam largely 
funded a part-time coordinator of the network during 2012 and 2013, although the initiative is not 
registered and remains informal. Members are keen to keep the group ‘light’ and expressed a strong 
sentiment that the group must come together in a genuine way. As summarised in the SAFIS 
‘Declaration on International Solidarity and People’s Co-operation’, the group’s aims include: 
 ‘We will come together as a forum to consider key political, social and economic issues and, 
wherever practicable, will seek to address these in a collective voice and through concrete 
proposals to address injustice, oppression and developmental needs of people. 
 We will express solidarity – including through mass mobilisation and mass action – with those 
social classes, communities and people who face oppression or injustice, irrespective of 
national boundaries, including non-nationals within South Africa who continue to endure daily 
and often grave violations of their human rights. 
 We will critically engage with the South African government’s foreign policy, particularly with 
regard to its role in the monitoring of, and accountability for, human rights violations through all 
bilateral and multilateral fora and mechanisms, with the goal of seeking to guide and shape 
policy processes and outcomes, in line with the principles and values articulated in this 
declaration.’ (ibid.) 
 
Since the network launched in November 2011 it has organised a series of debates on issues such as 
migration and security, but there has not been as much progress as hoped in systematically engaging 
with and influencing government policy. The group has struggled with the challenge of implementing 
its well-crafted principles and workplan in order to keep the initial momentum and meet expectations. 
At the moment, it appears that members of the network do not prioritise joint initiatives, but rather 
favour pursuing their own organisational goals. Whether SAFIS can be an effective platform that has 
a role shaping South Africa’s foreign policy in the way its founders hoped it would remains to be seen. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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4  Civil society from the BRICS and 
development cooperation practice 
 
In addition to policy debate, CSOs from the BRICS countries have also been engaging in 
development cooperation practice, both through their own civil society-led initiatives and as 
outsourced service providers for government and corporate actors. A 2013 report 
commissioned by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) China acknowledged 
the fragmentary nature of most current civil society engagement in SSDC, but concluded by 
highlighting the opportunities for greater collaboration with CSOs to strengthen rising power 
governments’ own South–South cooperation practice: 
 
Despite its challenges, government collaboration with CSOs in the context of SSC 
can be highly enriching. CSOs bring a wealth of diverse development experience that 
can be an invaluable resource for broadening and deepening the reach of SSC in 
partner countries. CSOs can implement on-the-ground aspects of development 
cooperation particularly well – for example, in humanitarian assistance, in working 
directly with poor people in the social sectors, or in strengthening practices and 
accountability for development cooperation efforts. Including CSOs in development 
cooperation creates domestic awareness of global issues, and engages important 
domestic constituencies in concrete expressions of global solidarity. 
(Tomlinson 2013: 13) 
 
Some BRICS country governments have created funding windows that CSOs can access for 
international development cooperation work, with the best-known example being India’s 
longstanding ITEC (Indian Technical & Economic Cooperation) programme (Chaturvedi      
et al. 2014). China has also shown increasing interest in channelling international 
cooperation funds through CSOs, though limited progress has been made and even 
GONGOs such as the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation tend to rely on international 
NGO or domestic corporate funding, increasingly complemented by direct public fundraising 
(see Box 4.1 overleaf15). South Africa has long made extensive use of CSOs in humanitarian 
and post-conflict work in other countries in Africa, and Brazil has begun to do the same 
through its large-scale programme of support to Haiti (Costa Leite et al. 2014). 
                                                                    
15 We are indebted to Zhou Taidong for contributing the information for this box. 
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In addition to operating as outsourced implementing agencies for government-led SSDC 
programmes, there are a small but increasing number of civil society organisations and 
social movements in the BRICS that have taken the lead in providing SSDC beyond their 
borders through CSO-led processes. Although the existing evidence base on the scope and 
results of these initiatives is very limited, as reporting is patchy and there are few robust 
evaluations, recent research has highlighted how CSOs have been responsible for some of 
the most innovative SSDC initiatives in a range of sectors (Poskitt and Shankland 2014; 
Bandyopadhyay and Tandon 2016). 
 
CSOs from middle-income countries like India, Brazil and South Africa often have 
experience of collaborating with organisations from other parts of the global South which 
began long before their countries became ‘rising powers’. These collaborations are usually 
based on values of solidarity among communities facing similar problems in different 
Box 4.1  The China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) 
CFPA, founded in 1989 and affiliated with the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty 
Alleviation and Development, is a non-governmental organisation that for a long time focused its work 
on poverty alleviation, heath, education, microfinance, rural development and emergency relief 
exclusively within China. CFPA started to engage in international humanitarian assistance in 2005 and 
in 2009 established an International Development Department with five full-time staff to be responsible 
solely for international development cooperation. 
 
The roles of CFPA in international development include three dimensions: 
 
 Providing humanitarian assistance: Since 2005, CFPA has responded to tsunami-related 
disasters in Indonesia, Hurricane Katrina in the US, the Pakistan earthquake, typhoon 
damage in Burma, earthquakes in Chile and Haiti, the combined earthquake and tsunami in 
Japan and drought in the Horn of Africa. In its response to the April 2015 Nepal earthquake, 
CFPA sent an emergency humanitarian team of 61 members to conduct rescues and raised 
more than US$1.5 million in China within five days after the occurrence of the disaster. 
 Implementing international community development projects: CFPA has operated 
international aid projects in 12 countries. Examples include strengthening maternal and child 
health care in Sudan through constructing and operating the Sudan–China Abuausher 
Friendship Hospital, improving nutrition and hunger relief through school feeding in less-
developed African countries and in Cambodia (the Smiling Children Project), building the 
poverty alleviation capacity of Sudanese NGOs, and providing scholarships and exchange 
opportunities for Myanmar university students (the Paukphaw Scholarship Project). 
 Conducting public advocacy: Starting from 2013, CFPA has also been actively engaging in 
public advocacy on China’s foreign aid and on the corporate social responsibilities of Chinese 
enterprises, seeking to increase public awareness and influence policy reform. Working with a 
range of different partners including international and Chinese NGOs, businesses, thinktanks 
and the media, CFPA has convened seminars and conferences, published books on China’s 
foreign aid and the internationalisation of Chinese NGOs, and organised field visits by a group 
of journalists to African and Southeast Asian countries to investigate China’s investment and 
aid in these regions and publish reports. In March 2015 CFPA, working together with other 
NGOs, thinktanks and the media, released the ‘China Foreign Aid Reform Initiative’, calling for 
the Chinese government to change the traditional ways of providing aid and enable Chinese 
NGOs to play a larger role in it, or in its words, to transit from the ‘G2G’ (government to 
government) to ‘G2G+P2P’ (government to government plus people to people) approaches, in 
order to meet the local needs of the recipient countries better and to improve aid effectiveness 
and efficiency. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on material prepared by Zhou Taidong. 
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countries, and often developed out of initial links facilitated by faith-based organisations or 
international NGOs (ibid.). As the overseas role of the rising powers grows, such 
collaborations provide an important foundation for joint civil society campaigns linking 
BRICS-based CSOs with counterparts in Africa, where debate on the opportunities and risks 
of engagement with the BRICS for their countries’ development is increasing among civil 
society actors (Vaes and Huyse 2013). 
 
Such solidarity-based linkages often form part of what Brigagão and Seabra (2009), 
discussing the Brazilian case, call ‘civic diplomacy’. While such linkages are often rooted in 
political solidarity, for example among peasant movements affiliated with the transnational 
Vía Campesina (‘the peasants’ way’) movement (Chichava et al. 2013), they may also have 
a religious dimension. This was evidenced in the role of the Catholic Church in promoting 
linkages with Haiti among Brazilian as well as Mexican CSOs (Costa Leite et al. 2014; 
Gómez Bruera 2014). It is also the case for the high-profile South African humanitarian 
organisation Gift of the Givers, which has its roots in Islamic traditions of charitable giving 
(Box 4.2).  
Box 4.2  Humanitarian assistance from a South African NGO  
Gift of the Givers Foundation is a South African Muslim organisation established in 1992 that 
operates in several countries in southern Africa, but also has active projects in Yemen, Syria and 
Pakistan. Claiming to be the ‘largest disaster response NGO of African origin on the African 
continent’ with projects in 41 countries, Gift of the Givers has worked in partnership with the South 
African government, including working alongside the South African Defence Force to assist flood-
affected Mozambique in 2013. The organisation is funded primarily by alms-giving based on the 
Islamic zakat system from South African Muslims and several South African businesses, although 
there is very little transparent information about its income and project budgets on the 
organisation’s website. Most of the organisation’s recent projects involve providing medical 
equipment and supplies to disaster-affected communities.  
 
In 2014 the organisation gained significant media coverage for coordinating negotiations with the 
kidnappers of two South African Christian missionaries living in Yemen. Imtiaz Sooliman, director 
of Gift of the Givers, claimed that he was contacted by the Yemeni group that had captured the 
South Africans in January 2014 after the South African government had refused to pay the 
kidnappers a ransom. Throughout 2014, Gift of the Givers attempted to mediate the release of the 
hostage Pierre Korkie with the kidnappers, widely understood to be a group affiliated with al-
Qaeda. Gift of the Givers coordinated an international campaign for the release of the hostage 
and claimed that they had used a group of Yemeni tribal leaders to secure agreement on the 
release of Korkie, just two days before a failed US Special Forces rescue mission in which Korkie 
was killed.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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5  Civil society from the BRICS and global 
development cooperation policy processes 
 
To date, CSOs from the BRICS countries have largely been included in the aid effectiveness 
debates that have dominated global development cooperation policy from the perspective of 
aid recipients. This has generated some tensions within existing transnational CSO networks 
over participation and representation of national and local organisations. At the same time, 
BRICS-based CSOs have been faced with the challenge of engaging with the rise of the 
BRICS Summit process as a key site for development cooperation policy, especially 
following the announcement that the bloc was planning to create its own development bank. 
5.1 Civil society from the BRICS in the era of aid effectiveness 
After engaging on aid effectiveness issues for several decades, civil society was officially 
recognised as an equal partner in development effectiveness debates at the Fourth High 
Level Forum (HLF) in Busan in 2011. This recognition was formalised in the establishment 
after Busan of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), 
which claims to follow ‘an inclusive multi-stakeholder approach with its broad representation 
and inclusive participation of varied development actors and countries in a way that 
surpasses the often-seen approach of mere issue-based consultation and outreach’ (Task 
Team on Civil Society Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment 2014: 5). 
 
Following the Busan HLF, the two main civil society groups that were engaging with the 
development effectiveness process, the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness 
and the Better Aid coalition, merged to create the Civil Society Partnership for Development 
Effectiveness (CPDE) in 2013. In a statement at the time, Antonio Tujan, the CPDE co-chair, 
stated that ‘the creation of CPDE is the consolidation of what we have built over more than 
seven years, from Paris up to now, concerning CSO involvement in development 
effectiveness… the CPDE platform will coordinate CSOs and ensure they work together in a 
harmonised way, in the North and South’. 
 
While some interviewees celebrated this consolidation of the position of civil society within 
the GPEDC, others were sceptical about the ability of CPDE to represent the diverse 
concerns and differing priorities of civil society. One civil society representative who was 
involved in CPDE’s work for the GPEDC First High Level Meeting in Mexico City in April 
2014 stated that ‘the major advantage for civil society is that CPDE are now inside the 
negotiations [but] the challenge for CPDE is now speaking with one voice as there is a vast 
structure underneath one person on the steering committee… the regional grouping and 
working groups can be useful to draw on information and strengthen the legitimacy of 
positions that the platform will take on an issue.’ These debates intensified after the Mexico 
City HLF, with BRICS-based CSOs continuing to question the representativeness and 
effectiveness of the CPDE (especially as its Working Group on SSC has been slow to gain 
momentum), against the backdrop of a broader process among rising powers of challenging 
the GPEDC’s legitimacy as a policy forum (Shankland and Constantine 2014b). 
5.2  Civil society from the BRICS and global aid transparency 
and accountability debates 
Since Busan there have been notable efforts from CSOs and some donors to improve aid 
transparency and monitor accountability to aid commitments. Several of the voluntary 
commitments in the Annex of Busan’s Communiqué related to transparency and reporting 
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and are now being implemented, as evidenced by the increasing number of international 
organisations and institutions publishing data to the International Aid Transparency Initiative 
(IATI) Standard and the 69 governments (including South Africa and Brazil) that are now 
participating in the Open Government Partnership. Numerous multi-stakeholder initiatives 
are gaining credibility, using research- and partnership-based models, with the Aid 
Transparency Tracker and the Aid Transparency Index, developed by Publish What You 
Fund, gaining increasing attention. These initiatives have also sought to extend their 
coverage to the development cooperation activities of the Rising Powers; for example, the 
China section of AidData.org aims to be a comprehensive online platform publishing 
information about Chinese development finance flows to Africa.16 
 
The progress in aid and data transparency in recent years is applauded by many 
international CSOs and institutions, but some initiatives are perceived as being more 
responsive to the changing dynamics in development cooperation than others. The Open 
Government Partnership is seeking to move away from traditional donor-recipient aid 
models, to capture and assess the complexities of emerging powers and SSDC financial 
flows. Brazil and South Africa were among the eight founding governments of the Open 
Government Partnership (along with Indonesia, Mexico, UK, Norway, the Philippines and the 
USA) and have both been members of the Steering Committee, which is responsible for 
guiding the ongoing development and direction of the Partnership. 
 
However, global transparency initiatives are facing several challenges. Firstly, transparency 
and accountability mechanisms are often perceived by BRICS governments to be a legacy 
of the traditional Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-led, 
donor-recipient development assistance model from which they want to distance 
themselves. China and India’s refusal to send official delegations to the GPEDC High-Level 
Meeting in Mexico in 2014 is a significant indication that the governments do not want to 
adhere to processes and initiatives that are still identified as Northern-driven. 
 
Secondly, the major transparency initiatives, such as IATI, Publish What You Fund and 
Open Government Partnership, do not sufficiently capture and assess the complexities of 
SSDC financial flows. Blurred lines between different forms of development assistance, 
private investment and trade negotiations make identifying, monitoring, and holding 
stakeholders accountable particularly difficult for transparency-oriented CSOs. In addition, 
there is very little transparency on or accountability for the estimated US$366 million in 
philanthropic contributions channelled from emerging economies to international causes in 
developing countries (Hudson Institute 2013: 5). 
 
A combination of sovereignty concerns, ideological objections to the OECD-DAC 
(Development Assistance Committee) reporting framework and weak domestic demand for 
transparency have resulted in a lack of systematically available data on SSDC and other 
development assistance flows. This combination has led, for example, to all the BRICS 
governments refusing to sign up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, despite 
their being among the nations with the most significant natural resources endowments 
worldwide (Munje 2014). 
 
However, initiatives are now under way within the BRICS themselves to establish a 
systematic reporting framework that adequately reflects the principles of South–South 
cooperation, spearheaded by the Network of Southern Think-tanks (NeST), which brings 
together leading development cooperation research institutes from several of the BRICS 
countries (Besharati et al. 2015). Despite the BRICS’ political objections to the GPEDC, this 
initiative was actually launched at the Mexico City High-Level Meeting, signalling an interest 
in continuing South–North technical dialogue – as long as this is not confused with the 
                                                                    
16 See China.aiddata.org. 
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intergovernmental negotiations on development goals and processes which the BRICS 
believe should be confined to UN fora (Shankland and Constantine 2014b). There is also an 
increasingly dynamic range of civil society-led transparency initiatives within the BRICS 
countries (see Box 5.1 below). 
Box 5.1  Open data initiatives and the data revolution 
Beyond the initiatives mentioned above that focus on financial aid data, some actors are looking 
to create new structures and systems that will better suit the needs and interests of CSOs in rising 
power countries seeking to monitor development cooperation flows. There have been a 
burgeoning number of civil society initiatives on broader transparency issues that are seeking to 
bridge the gap between open data and advocacy, by empowering citizens to understand and use 
available information to understand how financial flows affect people’s lives. 
 
Innovative projects are using open data sources and new technologies to mobilise citizen 
participation in budget monitoring in many of the BRICS countries. A number of BRICS-based 
organisations and initiatives are part of the research network Emerging Impacts of Open Data in 
Developing Countries, including Transparent Chennai in India, the Group on Public Policies for 
Information Access (GPoPAI) at the University of São Paulo in Brazil, and Open Data in the 
Governance of South African Higher Education at the University of Cape Town. 
 
While most initiatives are focused on domestic budget monitoring, some network members, 
including the Brasília-based Institute of Socioeconomic Research (INESC), are also active in 
international development cooperation debates, so it is likely that the group’s work will also end up 
influencing the approaches taken by BRICS-based CSOs to transparency and accountability 
issues in SSDC. 
 
The approach of the Open Knowledge network to engaging communities that have access to 
technology in ways that enable them to hold their governments to account requires little in the way 
of financial resources and is markedly different from many traditional donor-funded governance 
projects. ‘These initiatives do not want to be considered as development projects’, said one civil 
society interviewee, emphasising that ‘they have a business model with a social goal, but do not 
frame themselves as development projects.’ 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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5.3  Civil society engagement with the BRICS Summit process 
Since its inception with a meeting of the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and China17 in 
Yekaterinburg in 2009, the BRICS Summit process has become an increasingly significant 
arena for debates on the future of international development policy (Li and Carey 2014). The 
period during which fieldwork for this study was being carried out coincided with the hosting 
of summits by the three ‘democratic BRICS’: India in March 2012, South Africa in March 
2013 and Brazil in July 2014. This was also a period of some optimism across the BRICS, 
helped by a generally benign economic context for the countries themselves (if not for the 
global economy as a whole), though this economic context has since become significantly 
more adverse. Through their engagements in the IBSA forum, the three countries had 
indicated a desire to showcase their relatively open and democratic policy processes, and 
the presence of civil society actors with a strong history of domestic policy engagement, and 
a growing interest in their countries’ processes of ‘going global’ appeared to provide a 
promising backdrop for stronger CSO engagement with the BRICS as a multilateral forum. 
However, these expectations have been frustrated over the three summits, and by the time 
the summit cycle had moved to Russia in 2015, with the controversial inauguration of an 
official ‘Civic BRICS’ space within the BRICS Summit programme, CSO interviewees had 
become much more pessimistic about the prospects for engagement. 
 
When India hosted the BRICS Summit in 2012, Indian CSOs such as PRIA made a 
concerted effort to stimulate debate on the development implications of greater linkages 
between the five countries, both for India’s own development trajectory and for other 
countries. However, this effort was hampered by limited resources and by the low level of 
information among Indian civil society groups as well as the limited extent of CSO networks 
operating across all of the BRICS, despite a relatively high degree of Indian government 
openness to dialogue. When the summit moved to South Africa in 2013, there was optimism 
that a greater degree of momentum would be achieved, not least because of the rhetoric 
used by the South African government. For example, the Minister for the Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Maite Nkoana-Mashabane stated that: 
 
BRICS members are still talking about the overall and overarching vision. South 
Africa believes that we are there at the right time to make a kind of influence and 
make sure that BRICS doesn’t just focus on big governments, big economies, but 
also looks at softer issues on how to make sure that ordinary people benefit and can 
also take ownership of BRICS. 
(Quoted in John 2012: 8) 
 
One CSO reported having been told in a closed meeting that DIRCO would support an 
official BRICS Civil Society Forum, alongside the Academic Forum and Business Forum. 
However, they were also alerted that this idea would be a problem for other members of 
BRICS. This was to recur as an argument used by IBSA country governments, resisting 
pressure from CSOs to establish a more formal BRICS Summit process of dialogue with civil 
society by stating or implying that China and Russia would oppose any such move – even 
when it emerged that the IBSA countries themselves were the source of the opposition, 
which Brazilian interviewees stated was the case with India around the Brazil Summit in 
2014. 
 
The Durban BRICS Summit took place against a backdrop of rising alarm among some 
social movements at the growing economic presence of BRICS countries across Africa, 
linked to accusations of labour rights violations, environmental damage and ‘land grabs’. 
This provided an opening for civil society groups who opposed the BRICS as a ‘sub-
imperialist’ grouping intent on plundering poorer countries in the South to launch a more 
critical debate, making visible the divisions within civil society between groups aligned with 
                                                                    
17 South Africa joined the BRIC grouping in 2010, when it was renamed ‘BRICS’. 
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the different approaches that Bond (2015) has labelled ‘BRICS from above, BRICS from the 
middle and BRICS from below’. 
 
The Joint Civil Society BRICS Summit (also known as ‘BRICS from below’) took place 
between 25 and 27 March 2013 at the Diakonia Centre in Durban.18 This was the first time 
CSOs from across BRICS countries and beyond had gathered during a BRICS Heads of 
State Summit and organised a counter-summit. The counter-summit attracted more than    
40 organisations including NGOs, grass-roots groups and the media, as well as local and 
international academic institutions. It reflected the ways in which CSOs had to create 
informal spaces of engagement with the BRICS while at the same time claiming their right to 
engage with the BRICS’ governments through formal institutional mechanisms, after finding 
themselves marginalised from official BRICS meetings and discussions.19 
 
A booklet published by the event organisers, entitled A BRICS Reader for the Durban 
Summit, introduced the concept of ‘BRICS from below’ in relation to emerging narratives 
about BRICS. According to Patrick Bond’s introduction to the event, this concept represents 
a highly critical narrative deriving from ‘a bottom-up civil society network engaged in 
analysing, watchdogging and representing silenced voices of dissent’. In the discourse of the 
organisers, the BRICS civil society counter-summit represented the BRICS from below, 
while the BRICS Heads of State Summit represented the BRICS from above. 
 
This discourse risked projecting an understanding of civil society as a homogenous and 
democratic space that inevitably represents the interests and voices of those positioned 
below the more powerful group of heads of state (positioned above), overlooking differences 
and power relations between CSOs, the convergences and divergences of their interests 
and agendas as well as their positions and roles in the development industry. However, 
these differences became quite evident during the counter-summit in the power dynamics 
between international NGOs (the majority based in Northern donor countries) and CSOs 
from the BRICS countries themselves as well as from elsewhere in Africa. 
 
While the title of the event – Joint Civil Society Summit – underlined the idea of a combined 
effort, connection and shared ownership, it also highlights that separation was the starting 
point, and the need to bring separate groups of actors within civil society together. The 
separation became evident as the event unfolded, with one group coalescing around the 
BRICS-from-below event, while the other gathered in a different part of the same building to 
debate strategies for engaging with the BRICS Bank. While in the BRICS-from-below event 
there was a clear opposition to BRICS governments and their interventions at home and 
abroad, in the BRICS development bank event there was a more conciliatory position that, 
although critical, highlighted the need for dialogue and collaboration among CSOs within 
BRICS and with BRICS governments. The prominence of Northern NGOs in the event on 
the Civil Society Democratic Platform for Monitoring the Future BRICS Development Bank 
reflected the global power relations in North–South divisions and regions, highlighting the 
uneven geography of global civil society, the complex relationships between ‘Northern’ and 
‘Southern’ activists and organisations, and bringing to the fore issues of legitimacy, 
representation and voice.  
 
The spatial organisation, the agendas and the types of participants within each event 
revealed the tensions between local and global struggles, African transnational activism and 
local and transnational struggles, as well as organisational inequalities and identities. 
 
                                                                    
18 The Centre is also the headquarters and regional office of well-known South African NGOs such as Black Sash, Family Life 
Centre and Legal Resources Centre. 
19 This marginalisation was illustrated in the Declaration of the Fifth BRICS Summit (point 42), which while acknowledging the 
parallel meetings held by the Fifth BRICS Academic Forum, as well as the Third and Fourth BRICS Business Forums, did not 
mention either the civil society forums or the labour union meetings that occurred in the same period. 
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These aspects of the Durban process were criticised in subsequent civil society debates, 
and the criticisms were taken on board by the Brazilian CSOs who inherited the task of 
hosting civil society mobilisation around the following summit in 2014. In 2013, ahead of the 
BRICS Summit in Brazil, a group of CSOs and social movements agreed to establish 
dialogue with government about transparent participation of civil society in the BRICS 
process. They agreed to write a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency’s 
General Secretariat demanding the creation of a Civil Society Forum, based on Brazil’s 
social participation rights established by the federal constitution, UN experiences of social 
participation mechanisms and the government’s recent commitment to create a foreign-
policy council with civil society participation. 
 
However, before preparations for the Brazil Summit could effectively get under way, the 
country was hit by a massive wave of protests that convulsed Brazil’s largest cities. Among 
the many issues raised by the protesters, the poor quality of the country’s public health and 
education service provision and the contrast between its creaking urban infrastructure and 
the gleaming stadia being built at vast expense to host the 2014 FIFA World Cup were 
especially prominent. The protests led the government to become extremely sensitive about 
the risk of being perceived as prioritising foreign rather than domestic policy and wasting 
money on lavish international events. 
 
Brazilian civil society was also paralysed by the protests, as debates raged over the 
apparent rupture of the connections between elite CSOs such as those who had been 
leading debates on development cooperation policy and the mainly youth-led grass-roots 
groups who had come to the fore during the protests. Brazilian CSOs who had been active in 
the debates around the Durban Summit spent months fruitlessly trying to engage ‘the 
movements’ in dialogue around a joint agenda for the summit which Brazil was due to host in 
the north-eastern city of Fortaleza in July 2014, just after the end of the World Cup. 
Fortaleza had seen some of the fiercest protests over local infrastructure development, after 
thousands of residents were evicted or otherwise affected by building works designed to 
prepare the city for its role as a World Cup venue, and as a result the local movements 
showed more interest in using the summit to highlight their grievances than in engaging in 
debates about the future of development cooperation. 
 
Interviewees in Brazil also suggested that the timing of the summit, just three months before 
a presidential election that many feared would see the ruling Workers’ Party (PT) facing a 
resurgent Right, led many CSOs to back away from engagement with what they thought 
would inevitably be a confrontational set of mobilisations around the summit. Although 
vocally critical of many of the PT government’s policies, most NGDOs and academics active 
in Brazil’s development cooperation policy debates are party members or sympathisers, and 
they had no desire to encourage the party’s enemies by seeming to side with high-visibility 
protest movements questioning its record. The powerful Brazilian trade union confederation 
CUT (a key part of REBRIP, the civil society coalition working on foreign policy and 
development cooperation) was also reluctant to engage both because of its own links with 
the PT and because of the prospect that labour unions from across the BRICS would be 
holding their own meeting in Fortaleza as part of a strategy of securing recognition at the 
same level already enjoyed by the corporate players of the BRICS Business Council – a 
strategy for which an alliance with the NGDOs was at best an irrelevance and at worst an 
inconvenience. 
 
In the event, a common platform was cobbled together with barely a month to go before the 
summit, when Brazil was already succumbing to World Cup fever. With little time remaining 
to mobilise resources and communicate with other groups across the BRICS, a network of 
development-oriented Brazilian CSOs, mostly supported by external donors such as Oxfam, 
ActionAid, the Ford Foundation and the German political foundations, managed to assemble 
a reasonably broad-based meeting, which in the words of one participant included ‘leaders 
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from communities affected by mining in South Africa, academics and NGOs from China and 
India, as well as large international NGOs such as ActionAid’ (Garcia 2014: 2). 
 
The meeting did include a more significant engagement of internationally connected social 
movement organisations – especially those linked to the transnational agrarian movement 
Vía Campesina and the transnational feminist movement World March of Women – than had 
been the case in Durban. Some transnational coalitions came together in Fortaleza to 
engage with a BRICS Summit for the first time, including Sexuality Policy Watch, which 
launched a project to interrogate the implications for sexuality and human rights of the rise of 
the BRICS, seeking to establish whether they were more likely to act as a force to ‘re-
articulate the political economy towards justice’ or simply to provide a ‘South-based road 
towards new levels of capital accumulation’ (Corrêa and khanna 2015: 70). Women’s and 
feminist movement participation in particular was highly visible, benefiting from the 
incorporation within the civil society event programme of the ‘First BRICS Women’s Forum’. 
It was the women’s movement that took the lead in organising the only significant street 
protest seen during the summit, though even that mobilised only around a hundred people: 
despite all the expectations of mass mobilisation, grass-roots protest around the summit in 
Fortaleza was virtually non-existent, as it had proved to be during the World Cup once the 
opening matches had passed. 
 
The Fortaleza meeting repeated some of the tendency of the Durban counter-summit to 
devolve into a collection of parallel meetings attended by different groups, with little 
opportunity for cross-group dialogue. Despite a subsequent effort by key CSOs to agree 
common ground, it did little to move beyond the ‘BRICS from above, BRICS from the middle, 
BRICS from below’ differences deliberately highlighted by Patrick Bond and the other 
organisers of the Durban counter-summit – and also consolidated a perception that the local 
grass-roots groups identified by Bond as the heart of ‘BRICS from below’ have failed to 
engage substantially with the international solidarity agenda. Despite the presence of some 
international social movement organisations, the Fortaleza counter-summit demonstrated a 
limited capacity to mobilise grass-roots solidarity, falling far short of successful mass-
participation parallel events previously organised by Brazilian CSOs, such as the World 
Social Forum or the Rio+20 Peoples’ Summit. 
 
This failure to secure significant BRICS-from-below momentum was particularly 
disappointing because the Brazilian NGDOs who favoured constructively critical 
engagement with the BRICS – ‘BRICS from the middle’ in Bond’s terminology – had opted 
not to follow a strategy of engagement with the elite policy-influencing strategy of the BRICS-
from-above group, exemplified by the thinktanks who had gathered for the BRICS Academic 
Forum in Rio de Janeiro in March 2014. A civil society meeting initially planned to coincide 
with the Academic Forum was rescheduled at short notice to the following week – according 
to one Brazilian civil society informant, at least in part to avoid giving the impression that the 
NGDOs were too closely aligned with the government-linked research institutes of the 
BRICS Think Tank Council, which was meeting in parallel with the Academic Forum. As a 
result, they missed a chance to build the alliances with academia as well as the media that 
some BRICS civil society thinkers have identified as a strategic opportunity for CSOs, given 
that ‘the civil society-academia-media axis could be a considerable force to generate public 
debates and discussion on the BRICS policies, programmes and practices’ (Tandon and 
Bandyopadhyay 2013: 18). 
 
Significantly, Russian CSO participation in the Fortaleza civil society events was negligible 
despite the country’s role as host of the next BRICS Summit to take place after Fortaleza. 
This aggravated the problems of maintaining momentum from one summit to another that 
were always likely to emerge once the cycle of leaders’ meetings moved from the IBSA 
countries to Russia and China. As preparations for the Russia BRICS Summit got under 
way, talk of the potential for a BRICS-from-below engagement strategy receded and CSOs’ 
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focus shifted back to options for dealing with a BRICS-from-above approach in which 
academic institutions were promoted as strategic brokers of civil society engagement. When 
Russia announced that it would host the first ‘Civic BRICS’ meeting around its summit in July 
2015, it made a mockery of the claims of IBSA policymakers that their failure to establish a 
formal space for civil society–BRICS engagement had been due to Russian objections. At 
the same time, it cemented the inclusion of thinktanks in the BRICS definition of ‘civil 
society’, operationalising a strategy whereby Russian academic institutions with formal links 
to government ministries played a similar role in shaping the first Civic BRICS meeting to the 
one that they had played in shaping the first ‘C20’ meeting of G20 civil society groups (see 
Box 5.2). 
 
This has raised fresh challenges for the organisation of a parallel civil society event that can 
be structured in such a way as to avoid ‘surrender to co-optation and political capture by the 
governments’ (Carvalho and Beghin 2015: 2). Other BRICS summits are likely to follow 
Russia’s lead in officially welcoming civil society engagement while seeking to steer it in a 
way that allows for quite wide-ranging debates on the role of the BRICS as development 
actors and the implications of their policies for development in their own and other countries 
that nevertheless remain in the academic arena and do not spill out into the streets. This 
approach would certainly suit China, the 2017 host, which as noted above is eager to 
mobilise the capacity of NGOs to provide social energy and innovation for tackling 
development problems while maintaining control to ensure that such mobilisation does not 
risk touching on issues of regime legitimacy. It will fall to civil society in the 2016 host 
country, India, to identify creative strategies for balancing the potential for policy traction 
afforded by alliances with academia (including via the increasingly influential Forum on 
Indian Development Cooperation) against the risks of co-optation raised by the Russian 
experience, and for ensuring that common ground can be found between the contestatory 
energy of ‘BRICS-from-below’ mobilisation and the desire for critical engagement of the 
‘BRICS-from-the-middle’ networks within which most of the BRICS-based CSOs active in the 
development cooperation field are located. 
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5.4  Civil society and the BRICS Bank 
The one issue that is likely to provide civil society with the purchase it has so far failed to find 
on the BRICS agenda is the decision by the grouping to establish a major development 
finance institution, the ‘New Development Bank’. The intention to establish the BRICS Bank 
was mooted at the Delhi Summit in March 2012 and formally announced at the Durban 
Box 5.2  Civil society participation in Russia’s G20 and BRICS 
summits 
The pattern of civil society participation in the Russia ‘Civic BRICS’ process had to a large extent 
already been set by the experience of civil society engagement with the Russian G20 presidency 
in 2013. Civil society has a long history of dialogue and advocacy at the G20, and before that at 
the G8, but only recently has an official space for dialogue been created. After increasing calls 
from civil society for officially-recognised participation in the process, the first Civil 20 (C20) took 
place alongside the G20, B20 (business), L20 (Labour) and Y20 (Youth) during the Russian 
presidency in 2013. A South African participant described her participation in the Russia event as 
follows:  
 
I participated in this C20 Summit as a representative of one of four organisations from South 
Africa… We were all surprised to meet each other in Moscow. This made me think about 
the lack of coordination at national level and limited spaces to engage on international 
matters both within civil society and government.  
(Quoted in Pressend 2013) 
 
The same observer noted how dominant thinktanks were – the majority of them organically linked 
to various departments of the Russian government – in steering official civil society engagement 
with the G20 in Russia. Many of the same thinktanks were subsequently to become dominant 
players in the Civic BRICS process. One INGO representative interviewed for this study 
commented that ‘the steering committee for the Civic BRICS is made up of organisations and 
institutions closely linked with the Russian government and we hope this will not deter an active 
and open debate on the key policy issues we want to influence’. In the event, some of the key 
Brazilian civil society actors who had been responsible for organising the Fortaleza counter-
summit in 2014 decided not to participate in the Civic BRICS in Russia in 2015, on the grounds 
that it was a ‘pseudo space for participation in an authoritarian manner, where the Russian 
government decided who would participate, what themes would be discussed and the 
methodology to be adopted’ (Carvalho and Beghin 2015). 
 
When Australia came to host the C20 in November 2014, it attempted to secure a more 
transparent and consistent engagement process than had been apparent at the Russian C20. A 
steering committee was appointed by the Australian government to organise working groups and 
coordinate dialogue between policymakers and civil society. This steering committee was made 
up of 18 individuals who represented large organisations, networks and academic institutions. 
Ahead of developing policy positions for the G20 Summit, the steering committee hosted a public 
online consultation to reach CSOs around the world and set up an online crowdsourcing website, 
C20 Conversations, which enabled some CSOs to contribute to the recommendations. In the 
more polarised environment of the Turkish presidency in 2015, it proved difficult to maintain the 
same level of government support and intensity of electronic outreach and inclusive participation 
seen in Australia; the Turkey C20’s international outreach process was slow to get off the ground 
and highly dependent on Northern-based NGOs such as Oxfam. Nevertheless, according to one 
BRICS-based observer it eventually succeeded in promoting a ‘transparent, inclusive and 
participatory approach with wide participation of civil society groups from across the G20 nations’ 
(Krishnaswamy 2015: 7). CSOs are now grappling with the challenge of maintaining momentum 
from the Turkish to the Chinese G20 presidency, just as BRICS civil society groups did when the 
sequence of BRICS presidencies passed from Brazil to Russia in 2015. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Summit in March 2013. Initial response to the announcement from civil society was 
measured and cautious as there was little detail given about the governance and operation 
of the proposed institution. Public statements were made by some international NGOs, but 
there was little or no reaction from national CSOs. 
 
More organisations have now engaged, believing that there is an opportunity to influence the 
process of constructing the New Development Bank.20 There are currently research and 
advocacy initiatives within a small number of international NGOs and academic institutions 
that are seeking to establish a global civil society network to monitor the new financial 
institution, one potential tangible role for CSOs being to strengthen the Bank’s accountability 
and transparency. 
 
So far, a small number of international organisations have produced research or policy 
positions on what they want the BRICS Bank to look like, and have been seeking strategies 
to influence the process of establishing it, both at the central level and in its regional offices, 
the first of which will be located in Johannesburg. Some BRICS-based CSOs are beginning 
a process of constructively critical engagement, drawing on the experience they have gained 
in seeking to monitor the activities of their own countries’ development banks. Other civil 
society activists are voicing a strong ideological opposition to the Bank, pointing to the 
example of existing development banks in the BRICS countries to argue that it will 
‘exacerbate the human, ecological and economic disasters caused by multilateral financing’ 
(Bond 2013). Once the Bank becomes operational and begins lending to development 
projects with tangible social, economic and environmental impacts, these debates are likely 
to gain momentum, and provide a focus around which the fragmented BRICS-from-above, 
BRICS-from-the-middle and BRICS-from-below networks can converge. 
  
                                                                    
20 This is ‘something that did not occur, for example, when the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were 
created’ (Conectas 2013). 
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6  Conclusions 
 
In this report we have shown how the emerging roles of CSOs from the BRICS in 
international development cooperation are shaped by history and domestic politics as well as 
the shifts in the global economic and political landscape. The historical aspects include 
CSOs’ previous experience of engaging with development from the aid recipient standpoint, 
as well as their roles in transnational solidarity networks and in the often contested 
processes that gave rise to many of the BRICS’ domestic development successes. This 
continues to colour their perceptions of other key development policy actors, including 
international NGOs and the aid donor countries of the OECD-DAC. 
 
The domestic politics dimension accounts for many of the aspects of the ‘enabling 
environment’ for CSOs in the BRICS countries that create barriers for CSOs to engage 
effectively in South–South Development Cooperation policy and practice. Despite the 
apparently stark differences between China and Russia and the three ‘IBSA’ countries, there 
is no simple democratic/non-democratic divide in attitudes to civil society among the BRICS, 
as restrictive legal and regulatory changes inspired by growing suspicion of CSOs as 
instruments of ‘foreign interference’ have emerged in India as well as Russia and China, and 
relations between CSOs and government have become increasingly tense in Brazil and 
South Africa. Similarly, all the BRICS increasingly share an interest in stimulating CSOs’ 
participation in local service delivery while restricting the scope for them to shape national 
and international policy. Along with the steep decline in funding from traditional sources, this 
has compromised CSOs’ ability to sustain a strategy of combining grass-roots innovation 
with broad-based policy engagement. 
 
Another common factor is the increasing pressure that CSOs are experiencing to form 
alliances with thinktanks and other academic institutions. In some countries (notably India 
and Brazil), such alliances are helping to open up spaces for CSOs to engage in SSDC 
policy debates. However, these opportunities have tended to benefit only a small, elite group 
of organisations, and the agendas of the new spaces tend to be controlled by the thinktanks, 
who are increasingly being recruited by governments as their preferred brokers for civil 
society–BRICS engagement. The evidence from existing participation mechanisms, such as 
the C20, is that states will seek to use strategies of this kind to channel civil society voice 
into academic spaces that are safely divorced from grass-roots protest, seeking to co-opt 
rather than to block CSO engagement. This was evident in the 2015 Russia ‘Civic BRICS’ 
process that marked the formal acceptance by the BRICS governments that their summits 
should make provision for a specific civil society space. As a result, divisions have opened 
up between CSOs who wish to make the most of this opportunity and others who denounce 
it as crude co-optation. 
 
These divisions, in turn, reflect wider differences of identity, ideology and interest that cut 
across BRICS civil society. In this report, we have made extensive reference to the ‘BRICS 
from above, BRICS from the middle, BRICS from below’ formulation coined by Patrick Bond 
and colleagues. The majority of the BRICS-based CSOs who are active in development 
cooperation policy and practice fall firmly into the BRICS-from-the-middle camp, seeking to 
engage critically but constructively with government and corporate actors from their 
countries on their roles in international development. They are caught between ‘BRICS-from-
below’ mobilisation that denounces the BRICS as mere sub-imperialists, and ‘BRICS-from-
above’ triumphalism that promotes the grouping as the harbinger of a new, more just and 
equitable world order. 
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As the BRICS’ economies have stumbled, this triumphalism has begun to fade from their 
development cooperation efforts, though their determination to lay claim to what they see as 
their rightful position in the world is clearer than ever, visible in collective efforts such as the 
New Development Bank as well as in individual initiatives such as Russia’s armed 
interventionism or China’s soft-power ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy. CSOs are seeing new 
opportunities to engage with BRICS development cooperation policy and practice open up 
rapidly, through national SSDC programmes, the BRICS Summit process and now a major 
development finance institution, the New Development Bank. At the same time, the power 
asymmetries shaping their scope for influence within these engagements are becoming ever 
starker. 
 
Strategies will have to be found for navigating these asymmetries if CSOs are to fulfil their 
potential to infuse BRICS development cooperation with the innovation, energy, solidarity 
and critical spirit that characterise civil society-led international engagement at its best. For 
future CSO engagement to be both legitimate and effective, these strategies will need to 
mobilise new networks that are capable of linking different levels within and across countries 
and also different ideological positions across civil society. Building these networks will test 
the adaptive capacity of BRICS CSOs to the full, as they map out a post-2015 development 
cooperation landscape that is being profoundly reshaped by their countries’ new roles in the 
world. 
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